Blaming Russia

Condoleezza Rice has insisted that the interceptor missiles the US is installing in a silo on Poland’s Baltic Coast are “defensive” and “not aimed at anyone“. Russia argues that, in reality, the system serves to undermine its own strategic deterrent. Whilst the US may, with some ease, paint a programme designed to halt incoming missiles as defensive, we should consider the wider strategic implications of such a move. The point of a deterrent is to make any potential aggressor think twice before attacking; a missile attack by the US on Russia would currently be unlikely because Russia can counterattack and cause comparable damage to the US. If the US has moved to neutralise the potential of Russia’s deterrent system, by blocking any missiles from Russia, then it has given itself a significant strategic advantage; it may attack with relative impunity, and therefore affords itself a significant power-advantage.

Russia would appear to have some reason to feel defensive at this point. The blame for the conflict earlier this month was laid almost wholly at its feet, despite the reality being both more complex and more balanced (on this, see Gary Leupp and Charles King). NATO’s continuous move eastwards, likely eventually to encompass Georgia, challenges Russia’s self-perception as a Eurasian power and may see it attempt to boost its support in other regions of the world. Dmitry Medvedev’s wish to deploy Russian missiles in Syria is perhaps the latest example of this attempt by Russia to expand its influence, and to escape the corner into which the US seems determined to push it. The Syrian deal is comparable with the US-Poland system, although such comparisons escape a media which is able to publish the stories side-by-side without addressing the hypocrisy of a mixed reception.

Russia is far from a benign power, and surely harbours its own imperial ambitions (as does any state with the capacity to enact its plans). The danger is that western aggression (and the missile shield system can only reasonably be seen in this light – imagine a Russian plan to station boats around the US laden with interceptors) will force Russia to seek more extreme methods of preserving its deterrent; a situation which could see the weapons falling into the ‘wrong’ hands (not that there are ever ‘right’ hands for weapons to occupy). The US’s manipulation of Europe (which Obama’s chief foreign policy advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski argues is crucial if the US is to maintain its global primacy) is forcing Russias hand. Condemning Russia, and painting it as dangerous when it speaks out against ‘defensive’ measures is not productive, and distracts attention away from the real imperial danger.



Filed under Global Politics

3 responses to “Blaming Russia

  1. Weapons, from a simple sword to nuclear bombs, are never neutral. Thus, we cannot blame Russia if it dismisses Rice’s statements that the interceptor missiles in Poland as mere “lies”. Besides, if the “anti-missile” facilities in Poland are aimed at nobody, why establish it in the first place? For Iran’s nuclear attack? If so, then that defeats the argument that the facilities are “aimed at nobody”. Besides, if the target is Iran, why did the IAEA clear Iran for possessing nuclear weapons?

    But we cannot also blame Rice if she thinks Russia is just becoming paranoid. Russia’s actions has confirmed this by showing excess use of force outside Abkhazia and South Osettia.

    But then again, we cannot blame Russia as NATO is expanding in its backyard. Some NATO members are saying that Russia is having a Cold War Mentality as if they, too, are not inflicted. Otherwise, why expand NATO, a Cold War baby, in the first place?

    In short, everybody has a blame. So before these countries and organizations start bombing each other and wipe out the rest of the world, hopefully they should first sit down together and talk amicably. No more word wars as the only difference between “Word War” and “World War” is letter “L”. At any rate we all share a common sky and live in only one world.

  2. Pingback: Recent Links Tagged With "escape" - JabberTags

  3. The United States has debated the feasibility of a missile defense shield since Germany used V-2 missiles against Allied targets in World War II. As missile range, accuracy, and warhead type progressed in the 1950s, so too did interest in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses. Advancing Soviet technologies spurred missile defense research forward, and the October 1964 detonation of China’s first atomic device prompted the United States to announce deployment of its first ABM system—Sentinel (based on Nike-X)—in September 1967. Developed as a thinly layered missile defense against Nth- country threats, the Nixon administration later halted its deployment. Following a reevaluation, the program was renamed Safeguard and reoriented as a thick defense to protect U.S. Minuteman II silos against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. Safeguard became operational in October 1975; however, by November, both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate voted to terminate the program, as the Soviet Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) system could easily overwhelm its defenses. The multiple tasks of these early programs (defense against surprise or accidental launches, Nth country threats, Soviet ICBMs, and as a bargaining chip in bilateral arms control negotiations) heightened confusion and debate over missile defenses.3 Forty-two years later, this debate continues with mounting confusion and criticism.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s